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Abstract  
This paper tries to shed light on the historical analogies of the current crisis. To that end 
we compare the current sample distribution of Dow Jones Industrial Average Index 
returns for a 769-day period (from 15 September 2008, the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, to September 2011), with all historical sample distributions of returns 
computed with a moving window of 769 days in the 2 January 1900 to 12 September 
2008 period. Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov and a 
2 χ  homogeneity tests which have the 
null hypothesis of equal distribution we find that the stock market returns distribution 
during the current crisis would be similar to several past periods of severe financial 
crises that evolved into intense recessions, being the sub-sample from 28 May 1935 to 
17 Jun 1938 the most analogous episode to the current situation. Furthermore, when 
applying the procedure proposed by Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) for comparing 
densities of sub-samples, we obtain additional support for our findings and discover a 
period from 10 September 1930 to 13 October 1933 where the severity of the crisis 
overcomes the current situation having sharper tail events. Finally, when comparing 
historical market risk with the current risk, we observe that the current market risk has 
only been exceeded at the beginning of the Great Depression. 
 
JEL classification numbers: C58, E32, G15. 
KEY WORDS: Financial crisis, Great Recession, Great Depression. 1. Introduction. 
There is a burgeoning literature on determining the causes of the current global crisis 
and on finding precursors in past global crises (see, e. g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). 
In contrast with the main avenue of research in this literature that, following 
Eichengreen et al. (1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and several subsequent 
authors, examines the behaviour of key economic variables around crisis episodes, this 
paper tries to shed light on the historical analogies of the current crisis making use of a 
battery of statistical tests to detect past sub-periods where the distribution of the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average Index returns are similar to the most recent sub-sample 
covering the current crisis outbreak. 
The reason for studying the distribution of returns for the stock market in the United 
States is given by the fact that, while the crisis initially had its origin in this country in a 
relatively small segment of the lending market (the sub-prime mortgage market), it 
rapidly spread across virtually all economies, affecting stock markets worldwide, and 
so, many countries experienced even sharper stock market crashes than the United 
States. Moreover, starting with Fisher (1933), a number of researchers emphasize the 
importance of financial cycles for the real economy and there are many studies 
indicating that stock returns are related to current and future levels of economic activity 
(see, e. g., Grossman and Shiller, 1981). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric methodology. 
Section 3 describes the data set and reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 4 
offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Econometric methodology. 
We detect analogies to the current crisis using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (KS test). 
This is a nonparametric test for the equality of continuous, one-dimensional probability 
distributions that can be used to compare two sub-samples (see Rohatgi, 1976). The null 
distribution of this statistic is calculated under the null hypothesis that the samples are 
drawn from the same distribution (i. e., equal distributions for both sub-samples), and 
the alternative corresponds to different distributions. Let  12 , ,..., n X XX  and  12 , ,..., m YY Y be independent random samples of returns having 
unknown continuous distribution functions  () F x  and  () Gx respectively.  
In order to establish the hypothesis test: 
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This result can be used to provide the critical value dα  for accepting the null  0 H , that is 
to find dα  such that 
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, and tables of dα for various 
values of α  are available in Owen (1962). For instance, it is easy to check using (2) that 1/2
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 with a significance level of 0.05. 
As additional evidence for detecting analogies to the current crisis we have also 
considered the Chi-Square Test for Homogeneity (see Rohatgi, 1976). Now let 
12 , ,..., k AA A  be a partition of the real line, and let  12 , ,..., n X XX  and  12 , ,..., m YY Y be 
independent random samples of returns, like above. In what follows n=m for 
convenience. Let  ( ) X i  be the number of observations in  12 , ,..., n X XX  that lie in the set 
i A , and  () Yi be the number of observations in  12 , ,..., n YY Y that lie in the set  i A . Let 
() ()
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is approximately 
2 χ , with k-1 degrees of freedom, which permits us to establish a 
second version of the hypothesis test (1). 
Some authors cast doubts on the practical applications of the KS and 
2 χ  tests because 
they are not constructive and, so, when rejection of  0 H   occurs, the tests generally 
provide no guidance as to why: because the samples are not independent, because the 
samples have different distributions or both. In this sense Diebold, Gunther and Tay 
(1998) (DGT hereafter) have provided a new test for comparing densities of sub-
samples. Given the sample density function  () X p u of a sample  12 , ,..., n X XX , the 
probability integral transformation of another sample  12 , ,..., n YY Y is the cumulative 
density function corresponding to the density () X p u  evaluated at  t Y , 
()
t Y
tX Z pu d u
−∞ =∫                          (4) Under the null hypothesis that  12 , ,..., n X XX  and  12 , ,..., m YY Y are independent random 
samples having a common unknown continuous distribution, the  12 ,, . . . , m Z ZZ  must be 
independent and uniformly distributed  ( ) 0,1 U  in the interval( ) 0,1 .  
DGT (1998) propose a graphical procedure for rejecting the null based on looking at the 
histogram of the probability integral transformation. This procedure consists of 
comparing the estimated density of the probability integral transformation (3) to a 
( ) 0,1 U  by computing confidence intervals under the null hypothesis of i.i.d.  ( ) 0,1 U . 
Besides, in order to evaluate whether  t Z  in (4) is i.i.d., they propose using the 
correlogram, supplemented with the usual Bartlett confidence intervals. In this sense, 
serial correlation in the  tt Z Z −  series indicates that the conditional mean dynamic of the 
returns  t X  are different to the conditional mean dynamic of the returns t Y . If potentially 
sophisticated nonlinear forms of dependence are looked for, it is necessary examine the 
correlograms of powers of tt Z Z − , that is( )
2
tt Z Z − , ( )
3
tt Z Z −  and ( )
4
tt Z Z − . 
 
3. Data and empirical results. 
3.1 Data. 
In this paper we use daily data of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (DJIA) from 
2 January 1900 to 30 September 2011 provided by Reuters’ EcoWin Pro
1. We first 
compute daily returns for this period and calculate the histogram of all probability 
distributions obtained using a moving 769-day window. We then make use of the KS 
test to compare all these histograms with the histogram computed for the last 769 days 
in the sample, covering the period from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Inc. on 15 September 2008 to the end of the sample. We take the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. as a breaking point, since it is thought to have played a major 
role in the unfolding of the current global financial crisis and in the abrupt contraction 
of economic activity registered worldwide. 
                                                 
1 The DJIA and Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite (S&P500) indexes are very highly correlated with 
each other, telling a similar story in levels, returns and volatility. The use of DJIA is likely to be sufficient 
for analysing the issues at hand. 3.2 The KS and 
2 χ  tests 
Figure 1 plots the computed values of the KS statistic when comparing all the 
histograms of possible successive 769-day returns computed for the DJIA from 2 
January 1900 with the histogram associated with 769-day returns after the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers. The dashed line corresponds to the critical value of 1.36. As stated 
before, computed tests greater than 1.36 reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions 
of both sub-samples at a significance level of 95%. The minimum value is obtained 
when comparing with the subsample starting on 28 May 1935 and the maximum value 
is reached when comparing with the subsample starting on 10 September 1930. 
Figure 1: Historical evolution of Kolmogorov–Smirnov test comparing the DJIA 
returns in the current crisis to past periods.   
 
As is shown in Figure 1, the past periods where the KS test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of equal distribution of stock returns to the last 769-day sub-sample are the 
following
2: 
•  I: 28 August 1905 to 25 October 1909. This sub-sample covers the Panic of 
1907, a financial crisis caused by a retraction of market liquidity by a number of 
New York City banks that evolved to economic recession, with numerous runs 
on banks and trust companies.  
                                                 
2 For the history of financial crises, see Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). •  II: 11 April 1914 to 26 July 1922. This sub-sample includes the short but 
extremely painful recession of 1920–1921. 
•  III: 26 January 1927 to 16 December 1930. This sub-sample embraces a period 
of stock markets crashes worldwide leading to the Great Depression. 
•  IV: 30 December 1932 to 11 August 1941. This sub-sample encompasses the 
recession of 1937, which is among the worst recessions of the 20th century. 
•  V: 5 December 1973 to 25 January 1977 and 21 June 1974 to 21 August 1977. 
These sub-samples comprehend the 1974-1975 recession after the 1973 oil crisis 
and the 1973–1974 stock market crash. 
•  VI: 6 February 1986 to 14 April 1989. This sub-sample covers the 1987 stock 
market crash. 
•  VII: 22 July 1987 to 21 November 1990. This sub-sample includes the 1990 oil 
price shock and the early 1990s recession. 
•  VIII: 24 September 1996 to 17 April 2002. This sub-sample embraces the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1998, as well as the 1998 LTCM bailout and the early 
2000s recession associated with the 2000 Tech Bubble bust. 
•  IX: 12 January 2001 to 4 August 2005. This sub-sample encompasses the 
WorldCom bankruptcy in 2002 (the largest in the history of the United States at 
the time) and the 2003 turbulence in stock markets related to a pessimistic 
outlook for the global economy and increased uncertainty. 
As additional evidence of historical analogies with the current crisis we have also 
considered the 
2 χ  homogeneity test. Figure 2 plots the computed values of the 
2 χ  
statistic in (3) comparing the returns of the current crisis to past 769 day episodes during 
the history of DJIA. The dashed line corresponds to the critical value of 
2
1 30.14 χ − = k  at 
a significance level of 95%. As can be observed, the shape of the curves in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 is very similar. The main difference is that, in the 
2 χ  test, the null of equal 
distribution is only accepted in period III and period IV of Figure 1. 
 
 Figure 2: Historical evolution of 
2 χ  test comparing the DJIA returns in the 
current crisis to past periods. 
 
Therefore, the KS and 
2 χ  tests reveal analogies between the current situation and past 
economic recessions, suggesting that the world economy could be heading towards a 
new and marked slowdown if it evolves as in similar situations that in the past.  
Given that the KS and 
2 χ  tests take the minimum value when comparing the current 
crisis with the sub-sample running from 30 December 1932 to 11 August 1941, it seems 
that, if history repeats itself, current high uncertainty and intensified downside risks 
could lead to a higher probability of a double-dip recession. Indeed, from 1933 to 1936, 
the US economy grew vigorously, output nearly returning to its level of 1929. But in 
1937, the recovery halted and the economy fell back into a second recession. This 
would be in line with the conclusion of a sizable body of empirical literature stating that 
recessions caused by financial crises have a history of being long, deep and difficult to 
fully escape (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009b).  
Our results are also consistent with Baur, Quintero and Stevens (1996) who report that 
during the periods that surrounded the crash, only changes in fundamentals have a 
statistically significant impact on the movement of stock prices, as well as with 
Shachmurove (2011) who, after examining the economic history of the United States, 
concludes that financial crises and banking panics are not exclusive of the nineteenth-
century, but that these phenomena are still reoccurring. 3.3 The DGT procedure. 
As further evaluation of the analogies detected in the KS and 
2 χ  tests between the 
historical and present return, we have applied the graphic framework developed by 
DGT (1998) to the periods detected in Figure 1 and Figure 2 where the KS and 
2 χ  
statistics take an extreme value (a local minimum or a local maximum). In all cases, the 
density function  () X p u  in the expression (4) was the empirical distribution of the 769-
day sub-sample starting on 15 September 2008 (the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers), 
and the random variable  t Y  in (4) was the historical period returns which we want to 
compare. As it will be shown, the nature of these histograms provided by the DGT test 
are completely different. 
For the case of local minima of the KS and 
2 χ  statistics in Figure 1 and Figure 2, where 
the null hypothesis of similar return distribution with the current crisis is accepted, the 
shape of the histograms for the probability integral transformation correspond to a 
uniform distribution, as could be expected. As an example of this behaviour, Panel A in 
Figure 3 shows the histogram of the probability integral transformation corresponding 
to the sub-sample beginning on 28 May 1935, where the KS and 
2 χ  take the absolute 
minimum, the dashed lines being the binomial confidence bands for a confidence level 
of 99%
3. So, this histogram corresponds to a  ( ) 0,1 U  variable
4. It suggests that the 
empirical density  () X p u  (corresponding to the last subsample running from 15 
September 2008 to 30 September 2011) and the density associated with the period 
covering from 28 May 1935 to 17 June 1938 have similar properties. The histogram 
obtained using the DGT procedure is also close to the uniform in the rest of local 
minima of KS and 
2 χ  statistics in Figure 1 and Figure 2.  
Now let us consider the histogram where the null is strongly rejected. Neither the KS 
nor the 
2 χ  tests specify the reason for rejection, however the DGT test does, and two 
patterns emerge in the histograms rejecting the uniformity. On the one hand, the KS and 
2 χ  rejection of similarity with the current crisis could be produced do to the fact that 
the returns in the analysed period have a lower volatility, the tail events are less frequent 
                                                 
3 Monte Carlo simulations show that the null can also be accepted with a confidence level of 95%. 
4 Observe that our sample size is 769 whereas in DGT (1998) the graphical exercise of comparing 
histograms was carried out with a sample size of 4000 observations. and the market risk is lower. For instance, this is the case represented by Panel B in 
Figure 3 which corresponds to the histogram associated with the period from 7 January 
1963 to 24 January 1966, where KS and 
2 χ  tests have rejected an equal distribution 
compared to the current crisis. In this case the histogram has a non-uniform inverted U 
shape, suggesting that the empirical density  () X p u  (corresponding to the last subsample 
running from 15 September 2008 to 10 September 2011) has a different density than the 
sub-sample (taken from 7 January 1963 to 24 January 1966) since both empirical 
densities have completely different tails. So, in (4)  12 , ,..., n X XX  present extreme values 
with respect to 12 , ,..., n YY Y.   
The pattern shown in the histogram in Panel B of Figure 3 is also present in all the local 
maxima reached by KS and 
2 χ  statistics with one exception. This exception 
corresponds to the absolute maximum of these statistics in Figure 1 and Figure 2, and it 
relates to the period from 10 September 1930 to 13 October 1933, when the financial 
crisis was extremely severe and major bank panics occurred (Friedman and Schwartz, 
1963). Panel C of Figure 3 shows the histogram corresponding to the DGT test for this 
period. The U shape of the histogram suggests that the returns in this period have a 
higher volatility, the tail events are more frequent, and the market risk is higher than in 
the current crisis. In terms of the empirical density  () X p u  (corresponding to the current 
crisis), it means that the period taken from 10 September 1930 to 13 October 1933, has 
a different density, that is  12 , ,..., n YY Y present extreme values with respect to 12 , ,..., n X XX  
in (4). The U shape in the histograms of the probability integral transformation is also 
found in the sub-periods beginning around the absolute maximum of the KS and 
2 χ  
statistics corresponding to Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 3: Histograms of Diebold et al. (1998) test with binomial confidence bands 














•  Panel A corresponds to the comparison of the current crisis with the KS and 
2 χ  absolute minimum, where the similarity is accepted.   
•  Panel B corresponds to the comparison of the current crisis with several 
local maxima of KS and 
2 χ  statistics. Here the current crisis has fatter tails.  
•  Panel C corresponds to the comparison of the current crisis with the absolute 
maximum of KS and 
2 χ  statistics. The current crisis is less severe. 
Following the DGT methodology, it is possible to evaluate whether  t Z  in (4) is i.i.d., 
looking for a serial correlation in the  tt Z Z −  series which indicates that the conditional 
mean dynamic of the returns  t X  (corresponding to the 769-day period after the Lehman 
Brothers default) are different to conditional mean dynamic of the returns  t Y  
(corresponding to the 769-day period from 28 May 1935 to 17 Jun 1938 where the KS 
and 
2 χ  statistics take the minimum value in Figure 1 and Figure 2). Moreover, 
potentially sophisticated nonlinear forms of dependence may be looked at for examining 
the correlograms of powers of  tt Z Z − . In Figure 4 we show the sample autocorrelations of tt Z Z − ,  ( )
2
tt Z Z − ,  ( )
3
tt Z Z −  and 
()
4
tt Z Z −  and the critical values  2/ T ± (where T is the sample size) of the test 
0 :0 H ρ = . As can be observed in Figure 4, the correlograms show no evidence of 
neglected dynamics of  t Y  returns series with respect to  t X  series. 
Figure 4: Correlograms of  tt Z Z − ,( )
2
tt Z Z − , ( )
3
tt Z Z −  and ( )
4
tt Z Z −  






















(a)  tt Z Z − . 
(b)  ()
2
tt Z Z − . 
(c)  ()
3
tt Z Z − . 
(d)  ()
4
tt Z Z − . 
 
The correlogram of  tt Z Z −  and their powers reveals that, although significant serial 
correlation in the series doesn’t exist, nonlinear dependences exist between  t Z  and th Z − . 
The strong serial correlation in( )
2
tt Z Z − and in( )
4
tt Z Z − reveals operative dependence through conditional variance and conditional kurtosis. So, the sample after the Lehman 
Brothers default and the sample where the KS and 
2 χ  statistics take a minimum value 
present different behaviour from the dynamical point of view of the conditional 
variance, even though the histogram in the DGT procedure (Panel A Figure 2) does not 
reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions.  
 
As additional evidence of the rejection of the null hypothesis for equal sample 
distribution, we have also studied the historical aceptance of similarity by the DGT test 
comparing the current crisis with past episodes. In this case the 95% critical values in 
the DGT test were obtained by Monte Carlo simulations and a total of 1480 acceptances 
of a similar distribution, out of 27796 769-day periods considered in the history of the 
DJIA, have been supplied (that is, 0.0532% of times). The acceptances of the null in 
DGT are produced around the local minimum values of KS and 
2 χ  statistics, especially 
during the period IV where their absolute minimum was found. The results are 
displayed in Figure 5 and the vertical lines show the 769-day sample periods where the 
null hypothesis of equal distribution was accepted.  
 
Figure 5: Historical acceptance of similarity using the Diebold et al. (1998) test 
comparing the current crisis with past episodes.  
 
Therefore, the DGT methodology provides deeper insight into our earlier conclusion 
from the KS and 
2 χ  tests. 3.4 Market risk evolution. 
 
Finally, we have also compared the historical evolution of market risk with its current 
level during the financial crisis. A well-known measure of risk used in finance is the 
Value at Risk (VaR). For a given portfolio and time horizon, VaRα  is defined as a 
threshold value such that the probability that the loss on the portfolio exceeds this value 
is the given probability level 1 α − . Nevertheless, the usefulness of VaR as a measure of 
risk is highly questionable outside the confines of near-normal distributions and one 
important limitation is that VaR only tells us the most we can lose if a tail event does 
not occur (e.g., it tells us the most we can lose 95% of the time); if a tail event does 
occur, we can expect to lose more than VaR, and the VaR itself gives us no indication 
of how much that might be.  
 
An alternative risk measurement to VaR frequently employed in empirical applications, 
is the conditional VaR (CVaR), also known as expected shortfall or tail-VaR (see 
Artzner et al., 1999). This risk assessment technique is more sensitive to the shape of 
the loss distribution in the tail, and is performed by assessing the likelihood (at a 
specific confidence level,α ) that a specific loss will exceed the value at risk, being a 
more consistent measure of risk compared to VaR since it is sub-additive and convex. 
 
The CVaR is the expected value of the losses exceeding the VaR, that is  
[ ] / CVaR E L L VaR α α =>          
Therefore, it is a weighted average of losses for the worst 100(1 )% α −  of cases 
exceeding VaR with a confidence levelα . 
 
In order to estimate the CVaR from our empirical distributions of returns and following 
Dowd (2005), we slice the tail into a large number n of slices, each of which has the 
same probability mass, estimate the VaR associated with each slice, and take the CVaR 
as the average of these VaRs. 
 
In Figure 6 we show the historical behaviour of one-day 95% CVaR estimated 
averaging 50 VaRs with confidence level from 95.1% to 99.9%. The horizontal dashed 
line represents the CVaR corresponding to the 769-day period after the Lehman Brothers default. As can be seen in Figure 6, the current market risk assessment has 
only been exceeded at the beginning of the Great Depression, and the maximum level of 
CVaR corresponds to the period from 24 October 1929, to 20 October 1932. This period 
corresponds to the maximum of KS and 
2 χ  statistics in Figure 1 and Figure 2, where 
the DGT test produces a U shape histogram (Panel C in Figure 3) revealing tail events 
deeper than during the current crisis.      
 
Figure 6. Market risk: historical one-day CVaR compared with its current level 
shown by the dashed line 
 
4. Concluding remarks. 
The current global financial crisis is without precedent in post-war economic history. 
Although its size and extent are exceptional, the crisis may have features in common 
with similar financial-stress driven recession episodes in the past.  
 
In this paper we have tried to identify analogies in past experiences with the current 
financial crisis. To that end, we have first computed returns form the DJIA Index using 
a moving 769-day window from 2 January 1900 to 30 September 2011 and, applying 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the 
2 χ  homogeneity tests, detecting similarities between 
the histogram associated with the last 796 observations (from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers to the end of the sample) with those corresponding to severe financial crises 
that evolved into intense recessions. Furthermore, our results also indicate that the most 
similar episode to the current crisis is the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggesting that 
the world economy could be entering a new phase of economic weakening, with a high 
probability of re-entering recession. 
 
To explore the robustness of these results, we have also made use of the graphic method 
framework proposed by Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) for comparing densities of 
sub-samples, obtaining further support for our findings. Additionally, we have 
computed the conditional value to compare the historical risk to the current risk, 
concluding that the current market risk has only been exceeded in a period during the 
Great Depression. 
 
We believe that our results might have both some practical meaning for investors and 
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